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STATE  ACTION  AND  CORPORATE
HUMAN  RIGHTS LIABILITY
Curtis A. Bradley*
This Essay considers the requirement of state action in suits
brought against private corporations under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS).  It argues that, in addressing this requirement, courts have
erred in applying the state action jurisprudence developed under the
domestic civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  It also argues that, even
if it were appropriate to borrow in this manner from the § 1983 cases,
such borrowing would not support the allowance of aiding and abet-
ting liability against corporations, and that this liability is also prob-
lematic on a number of other grounds.  The Essay assumes for the
sake of argument that corporations are not categorically excluded as
defendants under the ATS, although this is currently a matter of some
controversy.1
I. BACKGROUND
Enacted in 1789 as part of the First Judiciary Act, the ATS pro-
vides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
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1 It has generally been thought that corporations can be sued under the ATS,
but this proposition has recently been called into question. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., No. 06-4800-cv, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) (holding, in
a 2-1 decision, that ATS suits may not be brought against private corporations); Doe v.
Nestle, S.A., No. CV05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) (same); cf.
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. 09-15641, 2010 WL 3516437 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010)
(holding that corporations may not be sued under the Torture Victim Protection
Act).
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law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”2  By its terms, the ATS
covers only cases involving an alleged violation of international law.
For a variety of reasons, the alleged international law violation in ATS
cases is almost always a violation of the “law of nations,” also known
today as “customary international law,” rather than a violation of a
treaty.  As with violations of most provisions of U.S. constitutional law,
violations of international law, whether customary or treaty-based,
generally require state action.3  This is true even for violations of many
international human rights norms, such as the prohibition on
torture.4
The use of the ATS for international human rights litigation can
be traced to the Second Circuit’s 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,5 in which two Paraguayan citizens sued a former Paraguayan
police official for torturing and murdering a member of their family.6
The court in Filartiga held that “deliberate torture perpetrated under
color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the
international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the
parties,” and that, as a result, “whenever an alleged torturer is found
and served with process by an alien within our borders, [the ATS]
provides federal jurisdiction.”7  In this and similar cases brought
against foreign government officials, the defendant is alleged to have
perpetrated the abuse, and to have acted under color of state law in
doing so, so there is usually little difficulty in these cases in meeting
the state action requirement.8
In recent years, however, a large number of ATS cases have been
brought against private corporations, relating to their involvement
with abusive regimes.  For a variety of reasons, corporate defendants
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES ch. 2, introductory note (1987); 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 6 (Rob-
ert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 702 & cmt. b.  For example, the U.N. R
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment covers only torture “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the con-
sent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
5 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6 See id.
7 Id. at 877.
8 See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 924
(2007); Note, Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2039–41 (2001).
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are attractive targets for ATS suits: corporations are not thought to
benefit from the sovereign immunity doctrines that apply to govern-
mental defendants;9 most large corporations have a presence in the
United States, making it easy to obtain personal jurisdiction over them
in this country; they typically have substantial assets that can be
reached by U.S. courts; and they have an incentive to settle cases in
order to avoid bad publicity.
The Supreme Court considered the scope of the ATS in its 2004
decision, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.10  That case, like the corporate cases,
involved a suit against a private actor.  A Mexican national who had
been abducted from Mexico at the behest of the United States was
suing a private Mexican citizen for his role in the abduction.  After
reviewing the history of the ATS, the Court concluded that although
the statute was “a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action,”11 it served to “underwrite litigation of a narrow set of com-
mon law actions derived from the law of nations.”12  The Court also
held that claims could not be brought today under the ATS “for viola-
tions of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when [the ATS] was enacted,”13 and the Court identified
these paradigms as the norms against violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.14  The Court
explained that “[i]t was this narrow set of violations of the law of
nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threaten-
ing serious consequences in international affairs, that was probably on
minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its reference to tort.”15
9 Foreign governments generally have immunity from ATS suits, pursuant to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006)
(allowing suits against foreign states for tort claims only if the damage or injury from
the tort occurs in the United States); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (holding that ATS suits are subject to the restrictions in
the FSIA).  The Supreme Court has held that the FSIA does not apply to suits brought
against individual foreign officials, but it has indicated that these officials may be enti-
tled to some form of common law immunity. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278,
2292 (2010).
10 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
11 Id. at 724.
12 Id. at 721.
13 Id. at 732.
14 Id. at 715.  The Court based this list on a discussion by Blackstone of offenses
against the law of nations that violated English criminal law. See 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *68.  For discussion of the right of safe conduct, see Thomas H.
Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006).
15 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
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In articulating this standard for ATS cases, the Court in Sosa
noted that “the determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite
to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must)
involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of
making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.”16  Of
particular relevance to this Essay, the Court attached a footnote to this
sentence containing a reference to corporations.  The much discussed
“footnote 20” states that, in determining whether a norm is sufficiently
specific to support a claim under the ATS, “[a] related consideration
is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a viola-
tion of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is
a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”17  The implica-
tions of this footnote will be explored below.
II. STATE ACTION AND SECTION 1983
The state action requirement under international law is a poten-
tial obstacle to ATS suits against private corporations.  In considering
this requirement, it is useful to divide the corporate ATS cases into
three categories:  (1) cases in which the corporate defendant is
alleged to have violated one of the few international law norms appli-
cable to private actors; (2) cases in which the corporate defendant is
alleged to have violated a norm that requires state action and to have
qualified as a state actor when doing so; and (3) cases in which the
corporate defendant is alleged to have “aided and abetted” an interna-
tional law violation by a state actor.
With respect to the first category, there are a few international
norms, such as the prohibitions on genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity, that are thought to apply to private actors, at least
for the purpose of criminal prosecution of individuals before interna-
tional tribunals.18  It is uncertain whether these norms are sufficient
to support civil corporate liability in a domestic court, but, even if they
are, corporations are rarely alleged to have committed a breach of
one of these norms.  A possible exception would be for situations
involving private security contractors, and, in fact, ATS cases have
16 Id. at 732.
17 Id. at 732 n.20.
18 The statutes for the International Criminal Court and for the ad hoc criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda allow for the prosecution of individu-
als for these international crimes. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 25(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, arts. 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, arts. 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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been brought against such contractors, although these cases encoun-
tered other legal obstacles.19
It is more common to see cases in the second category, in which
the corporation is alleged to have violated an international law norm
that requires state action and to have qualified as a state actor when
doing so.  In considering these suits, some courts have analogized to
the state action jurisprudence that has been developed under the
domestic civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The § 1983 analogy has its genesis in a Second Circuit decision
from the mid-1990s, Kadic v. Karadzic,20 the facts of which are far
removed from the context of corporate liability.  In that case, Croat
and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina sued Radovan Karadzic,
the leader of a breakaway Bosnian-Serb republic, for allegedly
directing and overseeing the commission of human rights abuses by
military forces under his command.  The Second Circuit first noted
that the violation of some norms of international law, such as the
prohibitions on genocide and war crimes, do not require state
action.21  As for the violations that do require state action, the court
reasoned that the breakaway republic might properly be considered a
state for these purposes.22  Even if it was not a state, however, the
court concluded that Karadzic’s actions could still be considered state
action for purposes of liability under the ATS if he had “acted in con-
cert” with the Yugoslav government.  The court derived this proposi-
tion from the Supreme Court’s § 1983 decisions, stating without
explanation that “[t]he ‘color of law’ jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in offi-
cial action for purposes of jurisdiction under the [ATS].”23  Courts
have continued to recite this reference to § 1983 without further
analysis.24
19 See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); In re Xe Servs. Alien Tort
Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009).
20 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
21 Id. at 241–44.
22 Id. at 244–45.
23 Id. at 245.  In support of this statement, the Second Circuit cited a district
court decision from California, Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal.
1987), but the district court’s reference to § 1983 was for the different and less con-
troversial purpose of arguing that even an abuse of official authority can constitute
the requisite state action, and that, as a result, the existence of state action for pur-
poses of the ATS will not necessarily trigger the act of state doctrine. See id. at 1546.
24 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as a guide for whether a defendant engaged in official action); Aldana
v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).
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Relying on § 1983 state action jurisprudence to determine the
requisite state action under the ATS is problematic for several reasons.
First, it is in tension with the approach outlined in Sosa.  The Court
there made clear that only a “narrow set” of claims could be brought
under the ATS and that these claims had to be based on international
law norms that were both widely accepted and specifically defined.25
The Court also repeatedly emphasized the need for “judicial caution”
in allowing clams under the ATS in light of the foreign relations, sepa-
ration of powers, and other considerations implicated by ATS litiga-
tion.26  In addition, the Court observed that its “general practice has
been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative
authority over substantive law” and that “[i]t would be remarkable to
take a more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction that remained
largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries.”27  Using
domestic civil rights concepts to extend international law liability to
private actors beyond what is widely accepted under international law
is difficult to reconcile with these mandates.28
In addition, there are important differences between § 1983 and
the ATS.  Section 1983 expressly provides a cause of action, whereas
the ATS is simply a jurisdictional provision, albeit one that has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court as “underwriting” limited federal
common-lawmaking.29  Moreover, § 1983 refers to conduct “under
color of” law, whereas the ATS refers more narrowly to torts “commit-
25 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721, 732 (2004).
26 See id. at 721, 725, 728.
27 Id. at 726.
28 Accord Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C99-02506-SI, 2006 WL 2455752, *6
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (“Because an integral feature of international law is that it is
only binding on specific defendants, allowing a private party to be held liable based
upon notions of ‘color of law’ developed in this country would blur the applicability
of the obligations that international law imposes.  Expanding the reach of the ATS in
this way would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s repeated calls for judicial
restraint.”); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Graft-
ing § 1983 color of law analysis onto international law claims would be an end-run
around the accepted principle that most violations of international law can be com-
mitted only by states.”).
29 Compare Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (“[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no
new causes of action . . . .”), and id. at 729 (“All Members of the Court agree that [the
ATS] is only jurisdictional.”), with id. at 712 (referring to the ATS’s “limited, implicit
sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum common law claims under-
stood in 1789”); id. at 721 (concluding that “the ATS was meant to underwrite litiga-
tion of a narrow set of common law actions derived from the law of nations”); and id.
at 738 (referring to the Court’s “residual common law discretion”).
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ted in violation” of law.30  Section 1983 also was enacted against the
backdrop of a particular problem of public-private violence in the
South during Reconstruction, and its jurisprudence has developed as
a response to historical and structural features unique to the United
States.31
By contrast, although it is unclear precisely what the 1789 Con-
gress intended when enacting the ATS, many commentators have con-
cluded that the ATS was designed to reduce potential friction with
foreign countries by channeling sensitive tort cases involving aliens to
the federal courts, especially in situations in which the United States
would have had an obligation to provide redress.32  As noted above,
the Supreme Court adverted to this purpose in Sosa in referring to
“this narrow set of violations of the law of nations . . . threatening
serious consequences in international affairs.”33  That purpose has lit-
tle connection to the purposes of § 1983, which neither concerned
foreign affairs nor sought to avoid friction with the relevant govern-
mental actors.  Moreover, applying principles derived from § 1983 to
30 Cf. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Because the [ATS]
requires that plaintiffs plead a ‘violation of the law of nations’ at the jurisdictional
threshold, this statute requires a more searching review of the merits to establish juris-
diction than is required under the more flexible ‘arising under’ formula of section
1331.”).  The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which was enacted in 1992, con-
tains “color of law” language that is closer to the language of § 1983, but applies only
to causes of action for torture or “extrajudicial killing,” not to ATS suits more gener-
ally. See Sosa, 524 U.S. at 728 (noting that the TVPA’s “affirmative authority is con-
fined to specific subject matter,” and that “Congress as a body has done nothing to
promote” ATS suits not covered by the TVPA).  In addition, the historical background
and purposes of § 1983 differ substantially from those of the TVPA, which (as stated
in its preamble) was designed to “carry out obligations of the United States under the
United Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the protec-
tion of human rights.”  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256,
pmbl., 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992).
31 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (noting that § 1983 “was
passed by a Congress that had the Klan ‘particularly in mind,’” and that “[t]he
debates [in Congress] are replete with references to the lawless conditions existing in
the South in 1871”); see also 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 1.03,
at 1-14 (4th ed. 2003 & 2010 supp.) (describing history of § 1983).
32 See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Com-
mitted in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 481 (1986); Lee, supra
note 14, at 882; John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals “Violate” R
International Law, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 47, 48–60 (1988); see also Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)
(“There is evidence . . . that the intent of [the ATS] was to assure aliens access to
federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state court, might
blossom into an international crisis.”).
33 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
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broaden the scope of potential liability under the ATS for torts com-
mitted in foreign countries is, if anything, likely to generate foreign
relations friction—precisely the opposite of the likely goal of the
ATS.34
This erroneous analogy to § 1983 is material because interna-
tional law governing state action appears to be substantially narrower
than the color of law jurisprudence under § 1983.  For example,
according to the Articles on State Responsibility formulated by the
United Nations’s International Law Commission, in order for the
actions of a private party to be attributable to a state, the private party
must be either “acting on the instructions of, or under the direction
or control of” the state.35  The International Court of Justice endorsed
this test in its 2007 decision in the Genocide Convention Case and
expressed the view that the test reflected customary international
law.36
Few, if any, of the corporate ATS cases would meet this standard.
Consider, for example, Abdullahi v. Pfizer,37 in which it was alleged
that Pfizer pharmaceutical company violated international law by
administering a drug in Nigeria without the patients’ informed con-
sent.  Relying on the § 1983 cases, a 2-1 majority of the Second Circuit
concluded that there were sufficient allegations of state action
because the plaintiffs alleged that Nigeria had facilitated Pfizer’s
administration of the drug and had acted to silence critics of Pfizer’s
actions.38  Importantly, there were no allegations that, in failing to
obtain the requisite consent, Pfizer acted on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of, the Nigerian government.
34 See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad:
The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 2 (2009)
(“[T]he ATS has given rise to friction, sometimes considerable, in our relations with
foreign governments, who understandably object to their officials or their domestic
corporations being subjected to U.S. jurisdiction for activities taking place in foreign
countries and having nothing to do with the United States.”).
35 See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 110 (2002).
36 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) ¶ 401 (I.C.J. Feb. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf; see also Jessica Priselac,
Note, The Requirement of State Action in Alien Tort Statute Claims: Does Sosa Matter?, 21
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 789, 823 (2007) (“Applying principles of state responsibility,
rather than § 1983 jurisprudence, would likely result in U.S. courts finding that con-
duct that qualifies as a state action under § 1983 would not be considered state action
under the doctrine of state responsibility.”).
37 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
38 Id. at 188–89.  The dissent argued that these allegations were insufficient even
to meet the § 1983 standard. See id. at 211–12  (Wesley, J., dissenting).
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My claim here is not that courts are always confined to settled
principles of international law when developing the contours of ATS
litigation.  If they were, the reliance on § 1983 jurisprudence would
have been an obvious category mistake.  Instead, as Ingrid Wuerth has
argued, Sosa can reasonably be read to allow for the development of
statutorily authorized federal common law, with international law
being a relevant, but not exclusive, consideration in such develop-
ment.39  Indeed, if ATS litigation does not involve federal common
law and instead merely involves direct application of customary inter-
national law, there would be a serious Article III question in many
ATS cases.  Suits between aliens do not fall within Article III diversity
jurisdiction,40 and it is far from clear that a case involving customary
international law automatically arises under the laws of the United
States for purposes of Article III federal question jurisdiction.41
Hence, my argument is not that the reliance on § 1983 jurisprudence
is inherently a mistake, but rather that, in light of the limitations sug-
gested in Sosa and the differing purposes of § 1983 and the ATS, the
§ 1983 jurisprudence is ill-fitted for ATS litigation.
III. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
Even if it were appropriate to borrow from the § 1983 state action
jurisprudence, however, this jurisprudence would not support the
third, and potentially broadest, category of corporate ATS cases—the
cases that are premised on an aiding and abetting theory.  In these
cases, the corporate defendant is not alleged to have perpetrated the
abuse or to have itself violated a substantive norm of international law.
Instead, it is alleged to have in some way supported or facilitated a
foreign government’s international law violation.
39 See Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law:  A New
Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931 (2010).  While the majority opinion in Sosa is
far from a model of clarity, a number of statements in that opinion appear to provide
support for this federal common law approach. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (refer-
ring to the ATS’s “implicit sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum
common law claims understood in 1789”); id. at 732 (referring to the recognition of
claims in ATS cases “under federal common law”); id. at 738 (referring to the federal
courts’ “residual common law discretion” in ATS cases); see also Bradley, Goldsmith &
Moore, supra note 8, at 895 (“[T]he Court [in Sosa] inferred, from a jurisdictional R
statute that enabled courts to apply [customary international law] as general common
law, the authorization for courts to create causes of action for [customary interna-
tional law] violations, in narrow circumstances, as a matter of post-Erie federal com-
mon law.”).
40 See, e.g., Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800).
41 See Bradley, Goldsmith, & Moore, supra note 8, at 885–86 (describing differing R
views on this issue).
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The most prominent aiding and abetting case is the South Afri-
can apartheid case, in which various corporations are being sued for
having aided and abetted the South African government’s human
rights abuses during the apartheid era.42  The Second Circuit allowed
for this theory of liability in a 2-1 decision, with one of the judges in
the majority relying on the fact that there was support for aiding and
abetting liability in international criminal tribunals, and the other
judge relying on the fact that there was support for it in U.S. common
law.43  The Ninth Circuit had similarly endorsed this type of liability
before Sosa, relying on U.S. common law, although the decision was
subsequently vacated when the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the
case en banc and the case was settled.44
The analogy to § 1983 does not support this theory of liability.
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that its state action juris-
prudence “has not been the model of consistency,”45 it is possible to
identify a variety of factors or tests that the Court has employed in
these cases.46  Most of these factors or tests have been formulated for
situations in which the private party is alleged to be the principal
wrongdoer, “and the question is whether the State was sufficiently
involved to treat that decisive conduct as state action.”47  The factor or
test that comes closest to aiding and abetting liability is for situations
in which a private party acts as a “willful participant in joint activity
42 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Ntsebeza v.
Daimler AG (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), 624 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
43 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260 (“We hold that in this Circuit, a plaintiff may
plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the [ATS].”);  id. at 270
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (relying on international criminal law); id. at 287 (Hall, J.,
concurring) (relying on U.S. common law as reflected in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts).  The Second Circuit subsequently held that the standard for aiding and
abetting liability under the ATS must be derived from international law rather than
U.S. common law. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582
F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009).
44 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945–47 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). But cf. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (9th
Cir. 2007) (reserving judgment on whether aiding and abetting liability is appropriate
under the ATS after Sosa), vacated, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007).
45 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995).
46 See 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 5.12 (noting that “five state action tests can R
be distilled from the Supreme Court’s state action decisional law: the symbiotic rela-
tionship, public function, close nexus, joint participation, and pervasive entwinement
tests”); see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,
296 (2001) (noting “a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an
attribution”).
47 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
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with the State or its agents.”48  Unlike for aiding and abetting liability,
however, this “joint participant” basis for state action “requires a show-
ing of conspiratorial or other concerted action.”49  Moreover, “[i]t is
settled that the mere fact that a private party has induced a public
official to act does not constitute joint action.”50  The dissenting judge
in the apartheid decision recited this case law and noted that there
was no support in it for aiding and abetting liability, and the judges in
the majority did not disagree.51
Without explanation, courts stop looking to the § 1983 state
action jurisprudence when they address ATS aiding and abetting lia-
bility, and, in fact, do not even purport to look for state action at all
on the part of the private defendant.  They follow this approach on
the apparent assumption that state action is required only for direct
liability, not indirect liability.52  As discussed above in Part II, the anal-
ogy between the ATS and § 1983 is problematic, so, in a sense, the
lack of borrowing from § 1983 for the aiding and abetting issue might
be seen as a step in the right direction.  The problem, however, is that
courts are selectively using the § 1983 jurisprudence, and the result is
doctrinal incoherence.
More importantly, the resulting ATS corporate liability regime is
functionally anomalous.  Under this regime, courts in corporate ATS
cases only apply state action requirements when the corporation is
alleged to be a direct perpetrator of the abuse.  The result is that cor-
porations are less likely to be held liable under the ATS when they
directly commit abuses than when they merely facilitate them.  It
seems highly unlikely that Congress would enact such a liability
regime if it addressed the issue.
Although one might argue that this consequence is simply the
product of applying international law—which, it could be argued,
allows for liability for state actors and aiders and abettors but not non-
state direct perpetrators—in fact, when courts determine the allowa-
ble contours of ATS litigation they are not simply applying interna-
tional law.  Instead, as discussed above, they are most accurately
48 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (quoting United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
49 1A SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, § 5.16[A], at 5-133. R
50 Id. at 5-142.
51 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 312–17 (2d Cir. 2007) (Kor-
man, J., dissenting).
52 See, e.g., id. at 281 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (“It is of no moment that a pri-
vate actor could be held liable as an aider and abettor of the violation of a norm
requiring state action when that same person could not be held liable as a
principal.”).
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described, particularly after Sosa, as developing statutorily authorized
federal common law.53  In this context, as the Court noted in Sosa, the
existence of undesirable “collateral consequences” is “itself a reason
for a high bar to new private causes of action for violating interna-
tional law.”54
In addition to this anomaly whereby corporations are less likely to
be held liable when they directly commit abuses than when they are
merely alleged to facilitate abuses, there are a number of independent
reasons to question the allowance of corporate aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS.  First, as noted, the text of the ATS refers to
torts “committed in violation” of international law, not behavior that
merely facilitates such violations.55  By contrast, just a year after the
enactment of the ATS, Congress enacted a criminal statute containing
specific provisions for indirect liability—for example, for aiding or
assisting piracy.56  The First Congress knew how to provide for aiding
and abetting liability and did not do so in the ATS.
Second, the Supreme Court has held in other contexts that it is
inappropriate to allow for civil aiding and abetting liability when Con-
gress has not specifically provided for it.  In Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver,57 for example, the Court declined to
extend the implied private right of action for securities fraud to aiders
and abettors, noting, among other things, that allowing for this liabil-
ity would expand the litigation in ways that would implicate policy
tradeoffs best resolved by the legislative branch.58  The Court reached
53 See supra text accompanying note 39. R
54 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
55 Some courts and commentators have cited to a 1795 attorney general opinion
as evidence that the ATS was intended to encompass aiding and abetting liability.  In
that opinion, the attorney general, William Bradford, considered the potential crimi-
nal and civil liability of U.S. citizens who had allegedly assisted the French in attacking
a British settlement in Sierra Leone. See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57
(1795).  While Bradford notes at the beginning of the opinion that there were allega-
tions that U.S. citizens “voluntarily joined, conducted, aided, and abetted a French
fleet” and then later in the opinion says that the injured parties could sue under the
ATS, he nowhere suggests that the ATS allows for mere aiding and abetting liability.
Nor did he need to make such a suggestion, since the U.S. citizens in question were
direct perpetrators. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 329 (Korman, J., dissenting)
(“[B]ecause the conduct involved direct participation by American citizens, who
acted with the intent to make the attack succeed, it seems likely that Bradford recog-
nized all of the perpetrators as joint tortfeasors, as that term was understood at the
time.”).
56 See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 10, 1 Stat. 112, 114.
57 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
58 See id. at 188–89; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (reaffirming Cent. Bank of Denver).
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this conclusion even though it recognized that aiding and abetting
liability was well established in U.S. criminal law.59  The Court further
observed that, if aiding and abetting liability were presumed to exist
under federal civil statutes that did not specifically provide for such
liability, there would be a “vast expansion of federal law.”60
In an instructive decision applying the Central Bank of Denver deci-
sion in the context of a terrorism liability statute, Judge Richard Pos-
ner, writing for the Seventh Circuit en banc, observed that “statutory
silence on the subject of secondary liability means there is none.”61
The court also reasoned that judicial implication of aiding and abet-
ting liability is particularly inappropriate for claims relating to foreign
conduct, because allowing for this liability “would enlarge the federal
courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction,” something that normally requires
clear congressional support.62  If anything, these considerations apply
with even greater force to the ATS, a mere jurisdictional provision that
was largely dormant for the first 190 years of its history, and which
today almost always involves claims concerning foreign conduct.63
This conclusion does not change merely because there is some
support in international criminal law for aiding and abetting liability.
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver declined
to imply aiding and abetting liability despite the existence of such lia-
bility under U.S. criminal law.  Moreover, the fact that nations have
agreed to agree to allow for a particular type of liability in an interna-
tional tribunal does not imply that it is appropriate for a nation unilat-
59 See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 181.
60 Id. at 183. Tellingly, the Second Circuit has acknowledged that the only reason
it has found corporate aiding and abetting liability to be proper under the ATS is
because it has looked solely to international law rather than to considerations of fed-
eral common law. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., No. 06-4800-cv, 2010 WL
3611392, *23–24 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010).
61 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
62 Id. at 689–90.  For application of the general presumption against extraterrito-
riality, see, for example, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2881–83 (2010) and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  For
discussion of extraterritoriality issues implicated by ATS suits against corporations,
see, for example, Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in
Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271 (2009).  In the Boim case, the court
went on to conclude, based on a “chain of explicit statutory incorporations by refer-
ence,” 549 F.3d at 690, that providing material support to a terrorist organization
could form the basis for direct liability.
63 Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (“[T]he general practice
has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over
substantive law.  It would be remarkable to take a more aggressive role in exercising a
jurisdiction that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries.”).
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erally to impose that liability in its own courts.  In any event, the
liability allowed for in international criminal tribunals, including aid-
ing and abetting liability, extends only to natural persons, not to
corporations.64
Third, aiding and abetting liability is in tension with several
aspects of the Sosa decision.  As previously discussed, the Court in Sosa
made clear that only a “modest number” of widely accepted and well-
defined claims should be allowed under the ATS.65 Allowing corpo-
rate aiding and abetting liability, however, substantially expands the
number of potential claims, something that the Court took into
account when rejecting aiding and abetting liability in Central Bank of
Denver.  In addition, as discussed above, the Court’s “footnote 20” in
Sosa provides that, in deciding whether to allow a claim under the
ATS, one consideration “is whether international law extends the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.”66
In support of that statement, the court cited two lower court deci-
sions that discussed the narrow circumstances under which private
actors could themselves directly violate international law.67  The Court
in Sosa, therefore, did not seem to envision that the ATS could be
used as a basis for secondary liability for private actors.  The uncertain-
ties surrounding the appropriate standard for aiding and abetting lia-
bility, and the policy implications of adopting one standard over
another in terms of the impact on foreign investment and U.S. rela-
tions with other nations, also suggest the desirability of congressional
input on the issue, especially in light of the Court’s repeated emphasis
in Sosa of the need for judicial caution.68
64 See, e.g., ROME STATUTE, supra note 18, art. 25 (giving the International Crimi- R
nal Court jurisdiction only over natural persons).
65 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
66 Id. at 733 n.20.  Similarly, Justice Breyer stated in his concurrence in Sosa that
“[t]he norm must extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the
plaintiff seeks to sue.” Id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring).
67 The Court cited to Judge Edwards’s concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995).  In the former, Judge Edwards concluded that the international law prohibi-
tion on torture did not apply to private actors. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards,
J., concurring).  In the latter, the court concluded that the international law prohibi-
tion on genocide did apply to private actors. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241–42.  Neither
decision appeared to contemplate that private actors could be sued under the ATS for
aiding and abetting violations of international law by public actors.
68 Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (“We have no congressional mandate to seek out and
define new and debatable violations of the law of nations . . . .”).
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For all of these reasons, the best conclusion, as a matter of post-
Sosa federal common law, is that courts should leave the development
of aiding and abetting liability to Congress, which can determine both
its desirability as well as its appropriate standards and limitations.69
Although the lower courts have been grappling with this issue for a
number of years, there is little basis for concluding at this point that
Congress has “acquiesced” in broad corporate ATS liability.70  Read-
ing anything into congressional inaction is hazardous,71 but it is a par-
ticularly dubious enterprise with respect to the corporate liability
issue, given its highly unsettled nature.  Moreover, the proper effect of
the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa on this litigation is still the
subject of significant controversy, and there is a reasonable expecta-
tion that the Supreme Court will address the topic in the foreseeable
future.72  Under these circumstances, there is no reason to conclude
that Congress’s failure to enact legislation restricting corporate ATS
liability constitutes an endorsement of, or even acquiescence in, such
liability.  Indeed, one could just as easily argue that, in the face of the
ongoing controversies over this litigation, Congress’s failure to enact
legislation supporting it constitutes disapproval.
CONCLUSION
In sum, there are a number of reasons to doubt the propriety of
looking to § 1983 jurisprudence in discerning whether there is state
69 Accord Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
8, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919) (“[T]he
creation of civil aiding and abetting liability is a legislative act separate and apart from
the recognition of a cause of action against the primary actor, and one that the courts
should not undertake without congressional direction.”); Supplemental Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.
2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628) (“Ultimately, the questions of whether and, if so,
how to expand the reach of civil liability under international law beyond the
tortfeasor would present difficult policy and foreign relations considerations that
should be determined by Congress, not the courts.”).
70 Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (allowing some ATS litigation to continue because
“Congress . . . has not only expressed no disagreement with our view of the proper
exercise of the judicial power, but has responded to its most notable instance by
enacting legislation supplementing the judicial determination in some detail,” and
observing that “nothing Congress has done is a reason for us to shut the door to the
law of nations entirely”).
71 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,
95–108 (1988).
72 The executive branch supported Supreme Court review in the South African
apartheid case, but the Court was unable to muster a quorum because four of the
Justices owned stock in the defendant companies. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices’
Conflicts Halt Apartheid Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, at A14.
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action in an ATS case.  In addition, even if this analogy were appropri-
ate, it would not support corporate aiding and abetting liability under
the ATS, and the judicial development of such liability is otherwise
problematic.
